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This paper examines relationships between religiosity and intolerance towards Muslims 
and immigrants among Europeans living in non-Muslim majority countries by applying 
multilevel modeling to European Values Study data (wave four, 2010). Thus 
relationships across 44 national contexts are analyzed. The analysis found large 
between-country differences in the overall levels of intolerance towards immigrants and 
Muslims. Eastern Europeans tend to be more intolerant than Western Europeans. In 
most countries Muslims are less accepted than immigrants, - a finding which reflects 
that in post-9/11 Europe Islamophobia is prevalent and many still see Muslims with 
suspicion.  
A key result is that believing matters for the citizen’s attitudes towards Muslims and 
immigrants. Across Europe, traditional and modern fuzzy beliefs in a Higher Being are 
strongly negatively related to intolerance towards immigrants and Muslims, while 
fundamentalism is positively related to both targets of intolerance. Religious practice 
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and denominational belonging on the other hand matter far less for the citizen’s 
propensity to dislike the two out-groups.  With the only exception of non-devout 
Protestants who do not practice their religion, members of religious denominations are 
not more intolerant than non-members. The findings are valid for the vast majority of 






The citizen’s tolerance towards ethnic and religious out-groups is important for the 
social cohesion of Europe’s pluralistic societies. Research on this topic is of interest to 
social scientists and the European public. Even more so, as the number of immigrants 
has increased steadily since the 1970s, the largest group among them being Muslims 
(Kettani 2010).  
Religion in Europe has often been associated with intolerance. Dissent over religious 
values and -identities has long been a part of European national histories. The ethno-
religious conflicts throughout the 1990s and 2000s in South-Eastern European 
countries, the former Yugoslavia and Georgia are well-known examples. But religious 
intolerance is not just an Eastern European phenomenon that can be explained away by 
a legacy of conflict. The recent political disputes, the prohibition of the Muslim veil in 
France, Belgium and other countries, persistent Islamophobic campaigns of the extreme 
right across Western Europe that often result in anti-Muslim violence show that the 
relationship between religion and tolerance is difficult in the West as well. Strabac and 
Listhaug demonstrated using European Values Study data that these tensions are not 
simply explained by September 11 and its aftermath, as anti-Muslim prejudice was 
already found to be an issue in Western Europe in 1999 (Strabac and Listhaug 2008).  
What is often forgotten in the heat of public debates over the legitimacy of the religious 
and cultural ‘other’ is that religion is not necessarily detrimental to tolerance. Europe’s 
religious denominations, through their moral teachings of neighborly love have the 
potential to foster tolerance. The Bible (Mark 12:31), Catechism of the Catholic Church 
(Vaticana 2011) and the famous open letter to Pope Benedict XVI, signed by 138 
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Islamic leaders in answer to his Regensburg lecture (Anonymous 2007) inform us that 
tolerance of others is an essential teaching of both Christianity and Islam.  
This paper examines relationships between three dimensions of individual religiosity 
and intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants among the majority populations of 
Europe’s non-Muslim majority countries. The analysis is based on European Values 
Study data (wave four, 2010). Since the majority of Muslims in non-Muslim majority 
countries also have a migration background (either by being the descendents of 
immigrants or being immigrants themselves), it is relevant whether the respondent’s 
levels of intolerance is different towards Muslims than towards immigrants.   
Furthermore, this study is interested in whether religiosity is differently related to the 
two targets of intolerance. Anti-Muslim attitudes were found to be highly correlated 
with intolerance towards ethnic out-groups (Ford 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). 
One might thus expect their distributions and covariates to be similar. Nonetheless, 
mere correlation does not imply that the two intolerance measures capture the same 
underlying concept. Kalkan, Uslaner and Layman (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009) 
consequently distinguish between intolerance towards ethnic and cultural out-groups in 
America. It is plausible that intolerance towards Muslims is based on a rejection of 
cultural values that are perceived as incompatible with those of the Christian majority, 
while intolerance towards immigrants could be more related to general perceptions of 
ethnic threat and thus be unrelated to religion.  
The analysis presented in this paper compares levels of intolerance towards Muslims 
and immigrants across countries and explores whether religion is differently related to 
the two. Careful attention will be paid to differential effects of three dimensions of 
religiosity. Theory suggests that the believing-, belonging, and practice dimensions of 
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religiosity could be differently related to attitudes (Stark and Glock 1968; Huber 2007). 
Yet the vast majority of empirical studies on Europe so far have concentrated on one or 
two measures of religiosity, mostly church attendance and religious membership, 
thereby omitting the multi-dimensionality of religion. This paper contributes to the 
existing knowledge by analyzing differential effects of religious believing, belonging 
and practice in European comparison. The key questions of the analysis are: to what 
extent does the religiosity of Europeans living in non-Muslim majority countries 
influence their propensity to dislike Muslims and immigrants? Are the relationships 
similar across the two targets of intolerance? Do measures of religious believing, 
belonging and attendance differ in their relationship with intolerance towards 
immigrants and Muslims? 
 
2. Three Dimensions of Religion: Theory and Hypotheses 
The scientific study of ethnic tolerance and its relationship with religion goes back to 
American researchers of the mid-1960s (Allport 1966; Glock and Stark 1966; Allport 
and Ross 1967; Glock and Stark 1969; Herek 1987). Some of these early studies have 
already outlined multidimensional concepts of religion: Stark and Glock distinguished 
between religious belief, practice, experience and knowledge (Stark and Glock 1968). 
They found religious practice to be positively related to intolerance towards various out-
groups. Allport and Ross found extrinsic, but not intrinsic forms of religious practice 
and belief to be positively related to racial intolerance  (Allport and Ross 1967). 
However, the majority of the contemporary literature on Europe conceptualizes religion 
as one-dimensional. This may explain the inconsistent results: Some observe a positive 
relationship between church attendance and intolerance towards ethnic minorities 
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(Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003). Others 
find a positive relationship between religion and anti-Muslim attitudes only in Eastern-, 
but not in Western Europe (Strabac and Listhaug 2008, 280), and a number of 
contributions report negative relationships: Meulemann and Billiet (2011) observe in 
their study on 25 European countries that church attendance has a negative effect on 
ethnic threat perceptions in most countries. Likewise Billiet and de Witte (2008) find 
that non-religious are more likely than religious Belgians to express racist attitudes and 
to vote for the extreme right, and Coenders and Scheepers (2003, 332–3), and Billiet 
(1995) observe that regular churchgoers hold less exclusionary attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities than non-regular and non-churchgoers.  
Only few studies make a distinction between believing and religious practice: In their 
work on the American context Froese et al (Froese and Bader 2008; Froese, Bader, and 
Smith 2008; Mencken, Bader, and Embry 2009) report that belief in a wrathful as 
opposed to a loving God has negative effects on tolerance. Regarding the European 
context two studies are noteworthy: Eisinga, Billiet and Felling (1999) observe that 
neither religious believing, nor church attendance are positively related to ethnic 
intolerance. Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello (2002) on the other hand find church 
attendance to be positively, but doctrinal believing to be negatively related to ethnic 
prejudice. Both studies are now a decade old. The latter is to the author’s knowledge the 
only cross-national study of ethnic intolerance in Europe that systematically compares 
relationships with religious believing, belonging and attendance.   
We pick up on this work by applying a three-dimensional concept of religion, as 
suggested in some of the literature, using the latest European data.  
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Following  Stark, Glock and others (Stark and Glock 1968; Davie 1990; Olson and 
Warber 2008; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002) , we distinguish between a 
believing- (religious beliefs), a belonging- (denominational affiliation, church 
membership), and a practice (church attendance, religious participation, prayer) - 
dimension of religion.  
The most widely used measure of religious practice is church attendance, an indicator of 
participation in the activities of a moral community (Stark and Bainbridge 1996) and of 
social capital (Putnam and Campbell 2010). According to Stark and Bainbridge (1996), 
being integrated in the moral community of a church has beneficial effects on pro-social 
values, as church members acquire a shared set of morals through social interactions 
with religious peers. Active church members are thus more likely than others to 
internalize religious teachings of neighborliness and tolerance. This argument is shared 
by Billiet (1995) who finds that the moral teachings religious people acquire through 
regular church attendance indeed foster tolerance. Following the moral community 
argument, church attendance may well have a positive effect on tolerance even if it is 
unaccompanied by belief. According to Putnam and Campbell (2010), participation in 
church has beneficial effects on pro-social attitudes of non-religious people because the 
morals of the religious spill over to their non-believing peers. From this point of view, 
involvement in church, even non-religious volunteering rather than religious believing 
is key to increased tolerance. One may thus expect church attendance independent of 
believing to be negatively related to ethnic and religious intolerance. We thus 
hypothesize: 
H1: People who attend church regularly are less likely to be intolerant of Muslims and 
immigrants than non-regular and non-churchgoers.  
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However, we find it unconvincing that simply going to church, out of mere habit or 
social obligation should be more influential than believing. Private contemplation of 
one’s beliefs, on the other hand, may well be influential even without going to church. 
Socialization theory states that religious beliefs and values are largely transmitted 
through early socialization in the family (Acock and Bengtson 1978; Kelley and de 
Graaf 1997). They are reinforced through social interactions later in life but were mostly 
obtained in childhood rather than in church. Moreover, in many European countries 
only a minority attends church regularly but the majority of the population still holds 
religious beliefs. Thus the dimension of religious beliefs is likely crucial for attitudes 
like tolerance.  
In their classic theory Allport and Ross (1967) defined intrinsic religiosity as being 
religious for the sake of religion itself while the extrinsically religious utilize religion 
for worldly rewards like recognition and prestige: ‘the extrinsically motivated person 
uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion’ (Allport and 
Ross, 1967: 434). Allport and Ross found that the extrinsically motivated tend to be 
more prejudiced and racist while the intrinsically motivated, who focus more on their 
inner beliefs tend to be more tolerant (Allport and Ross, 1967). Since believing is more 
inwardly oriented, it can be seen as a measure of intrinsic religiosity. Allport’s and Ross 
I/E –Religiosity scale has been widely used in psychological studies (Donahue 1985; 
Genia 1993; Kirkpatrick 1993; Tiliopoulos et al. 2006) mostly on the American context. 
However, there is still a decided lack of cross-national comparisons incorporating 
Allport’s and Ross’ theory, or considering the believing-dimension of religion at all.  
 
The believing dimension can be operationalized via different beliefs in a Higher Being. 
The EVS-data allow for a distinction between a traditional belief in a personal God and 
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a more modern, fuzzy belief in a Spirit/Life Force. The EVS also contains a measure of 
individualized religiosity (‘I have my own way of connecting with the Divine’). While 
belief in a personal God accords with the traditional doctrines of Christianity, the two 
latter beliefs deviate from them and are more individualized and modern.  Since all 
major religions in Europe promote values of brotherly love, care and tolerance 
(Anonymous 2007; Vaticana 2011), we expect non-fundamentalist beliefs in God to be 
negatively related to both targets of intolerance.  
 
H2a: Belief in a Personal God and belief in a Spirit/Life Force are negatively related to 
both intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants.  
However, modernization theory  (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004) 
posits that modern, individualized and fuzzy religious beliefs which depart from 
traditional doctrines  are associated with more tolerance towards various out-groups 
more than traditional belief. We thus hypothesize that: 
H2b: Belief in a Spirit/Life Force is more strongly negatively related to intolerance of 
Muslims and immigrants than belief in a Personal God. 
As argued above, religious beliefs are largely socialized in childhood in the family 
rather than through churchgoing later in life. Thus believing is likely to have stronger 
links to social attitudes like tolerance than church attendance: 
H2c: Beliefs in God are more strongly negatively related to intolerance of Muslims and 
immigrants than church attendance. 
When studying relationships between religion and intolerance it is crucial to distinguish 
non-fundamentalist from fundamentalist believing. Fundamentalism has been found to 
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be an important predictor of ethnic intolerance (Glock and Stark 1966; Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger 1992; Wylie and Forest 1992; Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995; Laythe 
et al. 2002), political intolerance and homophobia (Laythe et al. 2002; Froese, Bader, 
and Smith 2008; Schwartz and Lindley 2009; Whitehead 2010; Eisenstein 2006). 
Fundamentalism is here defined as an exclusive truth-claim of one religion over others, 
expressed by the statement ‘there is only one true religion’1.. This definition follows a 
convention based on prior literature (Kirkpatrick 1993; Leeming, Madden, and Stanton 
2010)2.  Based on the findings from the literature we hypothesize: 
 
H3a: Religious fundamentalism is positively linked to both intolerance towards 
Muslims and immigrants. 
Furthermore, since fundamentalism is an expression of closed-mindedness towards the 
truth claims of other religions (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Altemeyer 2003), we 
expect fundamentalist believers to be more intolerant towards religious, than ethnic out-
groups. 
H3b: Fundamentalist believing is more strongly positively related to intolerance 
towards Muslims than to intolerance towards immigrants. 
Regarding the belonging dimension of religion, this research is interested in differences 
between members of Christian denominations and non-members. Denominational 
membership is an important marker of group-identity. It has been argued by identity 
                                                          
1 The statement ‘there is only one true religion’ is dummy-coded against the reference ‘other religions 
have some basic truths as well’ and ‘all great world religions have some truths to offer’.   
2 The choice to operationalize fundamentalism as an exclusive truth-claim over biblical literacy, another 
indicator of fundamentalism that has been advanced in the literature (Woodberry, 1998), was made for 
two reasons: firstly, this research is substantially interested in fundamentalism as a form of closed-
mindedness towards other belief systems. People, who do not accept that other religions may also have 
some truths to offer, can plausibly be expected to have a general tendency towards intolerance. It is this 
aspect of fundamentalism that the analysis of this article is interested in. Secondly, the EVS data do not 




theorists that the identification of an individual with a group takes place by delimiting 
the in-group from not accepted out-groups (Tajfel 1974; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; 
Seul 1999). This is likely to be true for people who identify with a denomination 
without being religious rather than the religiously devout members. We argued that 
across denominations the non-fundamentalist religious value Christian teachings of 
neighborly love and tolerance and are therefore less likely to be intolerant than the non-
religious.  
 
H4a: Members of different Christian denominations do not differ significantly in their 
levels of intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants. 
It is, however, plausible that the so-called nominal Christians, - people who are not 
devout but identify with a denomination (Voas  and Day 2010) may be more intolerant 
than their devout peers because they seek religious membership as a social identifier 
rather than for the sake of religion itself. If we find positive relationships between 
denominational belonging and ethnic/religious intolerance, it is therefore of interest 
whether devoutness is a moderator. If devout members are found to be more intolerant 
than non-devout and non-members we can assume that this is a true religiosity effect. If, 
however, belonging to a denomination is related to intolerance only for the non-devout, 
then this would point towards an association with religious belonging as an identity-
marker, - not a true religiosity effect. This can be tested via interaction terms between 
denominational membership and church attendance3.  
 
                                                          
3 Church attendance is used as a measure of religious devoutness because going to church regularly 
requires individual effort. Thus frequent churchgoers are assumed to be more devout than non-regular and 
non-churchgoers. Arguably, strong religious believing can also be a measure of devoutness. However, our 
measure of believing, ‘Personal God’ versus ‘Spirit/Life Force’ and non-belief is not a Likert-scale, hence 




H4b: If a positive relationship between religious membership and anti-Muslim/anti-
immigrant intolerance occurs, the effect is driven by non-devout rather than the devout 
members. 
 
The Influence of National Contexts 
A number of contextual factors have been found to influence ethnic tolerance and 
therefore need to be controlled for: Modernization theory posits that a country’s level of 
wealth and political stability is positively related to its population’s inclination towards 
liberal values and tolerance (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2003; 
Norris and Inglehart 2004). Hence our models control for GDP and levels of political 
stability as measured by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). 
Contact- and group-competition theories emphasize the import of the out-group’s size 
for the majority-population’s probability of tolerating them. Contact theorists (Pettigrew 
2008; Pettigrew 1998; Schneider 2007; Wagner et al. 2006) argue that large numbers of 
immigrants enhance chances of inter-group contact and thus increase tolerance. Group 
competition theorists (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 
2009; Quillian 1995; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010) argue the opposite: the larger the 
number of immigrants, the more likely are members of the majority to perceive them as 
a threat. Since the most religious countries in Europe are also among the poorest and 
politically unstable and are mostly sending-countries of migrants, it is necessary to 





3. Data and Methods 
The analysis is carried out using data from the fourth wave of the European Values 
Study (EVS 2010). The EVS comprises 47 European countries and is therefore the 
survey with the most comprehensive coverage of Europe to date. The data was obtained 
using stratified and multistage random sampling (GESIS 2012). Since this study is 
interested in intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants among the Christian and 
unchurched majority populations of Europe’s historically Christian countries, we 
excluded all foreign-born4 respondents and Muslims from the analysis. Thus 4,595 
foreign-born respondents and 2,501 Muslims living in Christian majority countries5 
were excluded. In addition, the 5990 respondents living in the Muslim majority 
countries Azerbaijan, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo and Turkey were also excluded from 
the analysis. Because of Eastern Germany’s communist past and the resulting cultural 
differences, Eastern and Western Germany are treated as separate entities throughout 
the analysis. Thus, 54,700 respondents in 44 countries remain in the analysis. 
 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
Intolerance towards immigrants is measured by an affirmative answer to the statement ‘I 
would not like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers’. Intolerance towards Muslims 
is measured by the statement: ‘I would not like as neighbors: Muslims’.   
 
                                                          
4 Foreign-born are all respondents who were not born in the country of residence (EVS 2008 ‘were you 
born in [country]? 1=yes, - 2=no’). 
5 356 of them live in Western Europe and 2,145 in post-communist Eastern Europe. 
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3.2 Independent Variables 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables of 
the models. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Devout religious practice is measured by frequency of church attendance (‘how often do 
you attend religious services?’). In addition, as a measure of civic engagement outside 
church, a dummy variable for volunteering in an organization was included in the 
models6.  
Religious believing is operationalized via three types of belief in God: traditional belief 
in a personal God, belief in a Spirit/Life Force as a fuzzy, modern form of belief (Voas, 
2009) that is often associated with modernization and religious individualization7. In 
addition, the statement ‘I have my own way of connecting with the divine’ is included 
as a measure of individualized religiosity that according to individualization theorists is 
typical for a new generation of increasingly religiously unattached, yet still spiritual 
people (Pollack and Pickel 2007; Voas 2009). Lastly, fundamentalism, operationalized 
as the belief that ‘there is only one true religion’ is included in the models.  
Religious Belonging is measured by denominational affiliation. The three 
denominations, Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox are included in the models with 
unchurched (having no affiliation) as the reference category. The sample has 53 Jewish, 
                                                          
6 Because some of the voluntary organizations in the main questionnaire were not asked in Denmark, 
volunteering was included as a dummy measuring if the respondents volunteer in any of the organizations 
asked, rather than using an additive index of voluntary organizations. 
7 Both types of belief in God are categories of V125: ‘Which of these statements comes closest to your 
beliefs? – there is a personal God, - there is some sort of Spirit or Life Force, - I don’t know what to 
think, - I don’t really think there is any sort of God, Spirit or Life/Force’. The two answers ‘I don’t know 
what to think’ and ‘I don’t really believe there is any sort of God, Spirit or Life Force’ were collapsed to 
form the reference category of the analysis because there weren’t enough cases in all countries to include 
the atheist category in the model.  
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5 Hindu, 35 Buddhist, and 1,016 respondents who ticked the category “other” with no 
further specification. They comprise the category “other denomination” in the models. 
 
3.3 Controls 
The following individual-level control variables were included: education (dummy 
variable: respondent has tertiary education), whether the respondent has experienced 
long-term unemployment of three months or more, the respondent’s age8, sex (male as 
the reference category), anomy as expressed by the feeling of having no or very little 
control over one’s life. Anomy is known to be related to intolerance (Billiet 1995). 
A number of studies have found authority-mindedness and particularly right-wing 
authoritarianism not only to be strongly correlated with intolerance (Johnson 1977; 
Whitley and Bernard 1999; McFarland 2010; Asbrock, Sibley, and Duckitt 2011) but 
also to be potential mediators of relationships between religion and intolerance (Laythe 
et al. 2002; Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Tsang and Rowatt 2007). It is therefore 
important to control for right-wing authoritarianism. The models include a measure for 
being right wing on a political left-right scale (1-10) and a measure of authority-
mindedness, the statement ‘having a strong leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament and elections would be a good thing for future society’.  
Country-Level Controls : Steps 4 of the multilevel models includes the country-level 
controls GDP per capita (IMF 2007), the World Bank’s political stability index for 2008 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009), and the percentage of foreign-born 
(aggregated from the EVS-data).  
                                                          
8 Because age does not have a linear distribution, age squared was included alongside age in order to 
adjust for that. 
 16 
 
4. Strategy and Analyses 
The analysis sets out to compare effects of religious believing, belonging and practice 
on intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants across Europe. A multilevel analysis is 
the appropriate approach (Snijders and Bosker 1999), as large between-country 
differences in the overall levels of intolerance and in the effects of religion are to be 
expected. Because both dependent variables are binary, logistic multilevel regressions 
are carried out using the software package STATA. 




] =  𝛽0𝑗 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3 𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑗 +   𝛽4 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓: 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓: 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽9 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽10  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙. 𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽11 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽12𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽13 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽16𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽17𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽17𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽18 GDPij + 𝛽19 % foreign-born + 𝛽20 Political Stabilityij + 𝛽21 Post-Communismij 
All models were tested for outliers through careful normality- and residual checks and 
multicollinearity diagnostics were carried out for all variables that were included in each 
model. When ‘would not like immigrants’ is the outcome, Northern Ireland and Iceland 
showed to be potential outliers. Tests of the effect of each on the model coefficients 
indicated that they are not influential cases. However, when ‘would not like as 
neighbors: Muslims’ is the outcome, Iceland is an influential case. In order to control 
for this outlier without losing statistical power, a country-dummy was included in the 
models and the intercept set to zero for Iceland following the suggestions of Van der 




Treatment of Missing Values 
The analysis has to deal with missing values: of the 54,700 respondents in the dataset, 
7,807 have missing values on one or more variables when intolerance towards Muslims 
is the outcome. When intolerance towards immigrants is the outcome, 8,551 cases have 
missing values. Thus, a missing-data analysis testing for MNAR (Enders 2011: 13) was 
carried out. All models were then run in two sets, first as a complete case analysis and 
secondly after applying multiple imputation using chained equations in STATA mi. The 
imputation model includes income, subjective health and life-satisfaction as auxiliary 
variables. 40 imputed datasets were created and stepwise random intercepts models run 
across the imputed data. However, the differences in the estimates and their standard 
errors between the imputed models and the complete case analysis are very small, 
yielding no significant changes in magnitude or significance of the results of the 
analysis. We are therefore confident that the results of the complete case analysis are 
not biased by the missing data. Since multiple imputation  made no difference to the 
results of the models and imputed multilevel models are disproportionally 
computationally intensive to run, we decided to present the complete case analysis. 
 
5. Results  
Intolerance towards Muslims and towards immigrants are correlated, but clearly do not 
measure the same underlying concept. Pearson’s phi correlation coefficient is 0.479 and 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.650, thus the two indicators would not constitute a reliable scale. 
Across Europe, only a small majority (54 per cent) of those who say they dislike 
Muslims also say the same about immigrants.  
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A first comparison of the country percentages of respondents saying they would not like 
Muslims as neighbors with respondents who would not like immigrants indicates two 
things: first, intolerance towards Muslims is more prevalent across most of Europe than 
intolerance towards immigrants. This confirms Strabac and Listhaug’s earlier findings 
with older EVS data from 1999 (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). The statistical significance 
of the difference in the percentages between the two items was tested across countries 
using paired t-tests. Table 2 (third row) shows significant differences between the two 
items in most countries. In most of Europe, except Albania, Hungary and Russia, 
immigrants are more accepted than Muslims. Secondly, the Scandinavian and Western 
European countries are the least intolerant of both Muslims and immigrants, while the 
South-Eastern and Eastern European countries exhibit the highest overall levels of 
intolerance in comparison.  
[Table 2 around here] 
The bivariate relationships between the religion measures are as expected: all are 
moderately but not highly correlated. Spearman’s rho is 0.448 between church 
attendance and belief in a personal God, and -0.061 for belief in a Spirit/Life Force. 
Fundamentalism is correlated 0.297 with church attendance, 0.366 with belief in a 
personal God and -0.165 with belief in a Spirit/ Life Force. Of the respondents who 
attend church at least once a month, 66% believe in a personal God, 25% in a Spirit/Life 
Force and 36% say there is ‘only one true religion’. Of those, who believe in a personal 
God, only 49% attend church regularly. Likewise only half of the respondents (50%), 
who make the fundamentalist statement, attend church regularly.  A single dimension of 
religiosity can therefore not be assumed, the different religiosity measures may well 
show different relationships with ethnic and religious intolerance. 
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The Multilevel Models 
We proceed with the results of the multilevel analysis. The models for ‘would not like 
Muslims’ and ‘would not like immigrants’ are interpreted next to each other. For both 
outcomes the same models were run stepwise. In a first step each religion variable was 
included on its own in a separate random intercept model in order to ensure that no 
religion effect is controlled away by other variables. These bivariate coefficients are 
provided in tables 5a and 5b in the appendix. The bivariate analysis already suggests 
that religious believing matters more for intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants 
than belonging or practice. Only the coefficients of belief in God and of the 
fundamentalist statement ‘there is only one true religion’ are statistically significant.  
In the next steps individual- and country-level controls are included in the models.  
Table 3 presents the random intercept model for ‘would not like Muslims’. Model M1, 
in the first row shows the coefficients of the religion variables without controls. M 2 
includes the individual-level controls and M 3 includes the individual-level and country 
level controls wealth (GDP), percentage of foreign-born per country, and political 
stability (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).  
[Table 3 around here] 
[Table 4 around here] 
Table 3 demonstrates that of the three dimensions of religiosity, believing clearly 
matters most for the European’s likelihood of being intolerant towards Muslims. The 
coefficients of non-fundamentalist believing are significantly negative, indicating that 
people who believe in a Higher Being (a personal God or a ‘Spirit/Life Force’) are less 
inclined than non-believers to say they would not want to live next door to a Muslim: 
taking the anti-log of the model coefficients reveals that when holding the other 
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variables constant, believers in a personal God are 12% and believers in a Spirit/Life 
Force 15% less likely than non-believers to be intolerant of Muslims. 
The findings thus support H2a. The coefficient of ‘Spirit/Life Force’ is noticeably larger 
than the coefficient of belief in a personal God, indicating that modern fuzzy believing 
is more conductive of tolerance than traditional belief, as modernization theory would 
predict. The finding supports H2b. Individualized religiosity (‘I have my own way of 
connecting with the divine’), too, is significantly negatively related to intolerance 
towards Muslims.  
Fundamentalist believing on the other hand is strongly positively associated with anti-
Muslim intolerance, as predicted by H3a: when controlling for the other variables, 
fundamentalists are 37% more likely than non-fundamentalists to be intolerant towards 
Muslims. All relationships are robust when controlling for country-level wealth, 
political stability, and the percentage of foreign-born (M3). 
However, church attendance is not statistically related to intolerance towards Muslims. 
The effect size is negligible even when tested on its own without including controls 
(Appendix A). H1is therefore not supported by the data with respect to Muslims, but 
H2c is: believing matters more for religious intolerance than church attendance. The 
moral community argument thus finds little support from the European data. Secular 
volunteering on the other hand is indeed negatively related to anti-Muslim intolerance, 
as predicted by social capital theory.  
As to the dimension of religious belonging, Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox do not 
differ significantly in their levels of intolerance towards Muslims. H4a is therefore 
partly supported: religious belonging is not a predictor of intolerance towards Muslims 
in Europe. Only ‘other denomination’ shows a statistically significant coefficient and 
the relationship is strongly negative.  
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The result is not surprising. Since the respondents in this category are all members of 
religious minorities, who may well themselves feel discriminated against it makes sense 
for them to be compassionate of other religious minorities.  
The controls show the expected relationships: women and highly educated people are 
less likely to be intolerant of Muslims than men and the lower educated. Individuals 
suffering from anomy, right-wing supporters and people who prefer a strong leader over 
a democracy are more likely to be intolerant. On the country-level, poverty and political 
instability are strong predictors of intolerance towards Muslims, while the proportion of 
foreign-born among the population is not statistically significant. The finding confirms 
prior findings by Strabac and Listhaug (Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and contradicts both 
contact theory and group-competition/group-size theory9.  
Most importantly, including the country-level controls does not change the coefficients 
of the religion measures. The effects of individual-level religiosity are robust across 
countries. As a further test for cross-country robustness, random slopes were fitted for 
each statistically significant religion coefficient, thus allowing the effect to vary across 
countries. The random slope coefficients for both outcomes are supplied in table 6 in the 
appendix, together with visualizations of the country-slopes of religious believing 
(figures 1 and 2). The random slope models demonstrate some small cross-country 
variation, but only in the size, not the direction of the effects. The relationships are 
therefore robust across the vast majority of countries.  
The analysis moves on to intolerance towards immigrants. Table 4 contains the results 
of the random intercept models for ‘would not like as neighbors: immigrants’. The 
models show very similar results to the models with intolerance towards Muslims as the 
                                                          
9 However, group-competition may be better analysed on the regional level, as contributions using 
regional-level data did find statistically significant relationships (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Schlueter 
and Wagner 2008). In this paper, we are merely interested in controlling for group-competition as a 
confounding variable at the country level.  
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outcome: the believing-dimension again shows the strongest relationships. The log-odds 
reveal that believers in a personal God are 9% and believers in a Spirit/Life Force 16% 
less likely than non-believers to dislike immigrants. Fundamentalists, unsurprisingly, 
are 28% more likely than other people to be intolerant. Church attendance is not 
statistically significantly related to the outcome but secular volunteering is. Social 
capital indeed seems to benefit people’s ethnic and religious tolerance, but religious 
attendance does not provide a religious ‘booster effect’ as Putnam and Campbell ( 2010: 
445) had theorized. 
As to the belonging dimension, only the coefficient of Protestant denomination (table 4) 
is statistically significant: Protestants are 12% more likely than unchurched people to be 
intolerant towards immigrants. Since 85 % of the Protestants in the sample live in the 
wealthy immigration countries of Western Europe, it is important to control for national 
contexts. Model 4 shows that the relationship is robust when controlling for GDP, 
political stability and the percentage of foreign-born. The robustness of the effect is 
confirmed further when fitting a random coefficient, allowing the effect-size of 
Protestant denomination to vary across countries (appendix, table 5, last row): no 
statistically significant between-country variation was found.  
This finding is counterintuitive. The literature gives no reason to expect Protestants to 
be less tolerant than others. Moreover, the coefficient of Protestant denomination was 
not statistically significant in the uncontrolled model (table 5b, appendix), but becomes 
strongly significant when holding the effect of religiosity (church attendance, believing) 
constant. Hence the question arises whether this is a true religiosity effect. To test this, 
an interaction term between Protestant membership and church attendance was included 
in the controlled model (Table 4, M4). Model M4 (Table 4, last column) shows that the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant. As hypothesized in H4b, it is 
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the non-devout Protestants who are more likely to be intolerant. The more a Protestant 
goes to church, the less likely is s/he to be intolerant towards immigrants. Congruent 
with identity theory it can therefore be said that the positive coefficient of Protestant 
denomination is due to non-religious Protestants, who use their membership as a social 
identifier. H4b is therefore confirmed by the data.  
In summary, the results of the analyses lead to a rejection of hypothesis H1and support 
H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a, H3b and H4b. Believing matters more for both targets of 
intolerance than practice and belonging (H2c). Beliefs in God are negatively (H2a, H2b) 
and fundamentalist truth-claims positively related to both targets of intolerance (H3a). 
As hypothesized in H3b, fundamentalism is more strongly related to intolerance 
towards Muslims than immigrants (H3b). H4a is only partly confirmed by the data: 
most large denominations do not differ in their member’s propensity to dislike 
immigrants and Muslims, but members of religious minorities (‘other denomination’) 
are less intolerant towards both Muslims and immigrants than other people. With regard 
to immigrants, Protestants are the exception: the model coefficients in table 3 show that 
when fixing the other variables, Protestants who do not practice their religion are 12% 
more likely than non-religious people and 10 % more likely than Protestants who 






The analysis has shown that more Europeans express intolerance towards Muslims than 
immigrants. The result is not surprising given the history of post- 9/11 and the persistent 
Islamophobia that has been reinforced through mass media for a decade. Nonetheless, as 
others have emphasized (Ford 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008), ethnic and religious 
intolerance are highly correlated and although the two indicators are not suited to 
capture one common scale of ethno-religious intolerance, our models demonstrated that 
both share the same predictors. Both intolerance towards Muslims and towards 
immigrants show largely the same patterns of relationships with religion, social-
structural and contextual variables.  
Our main finding is that of the three dimensions of religion believing matters most for 
the European citizen’s inclination to tolerate members of ethnic and religious out-
groups. Both traditional and modern fuzzy beliefs in God were shown to be strongly 
negatively related to intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants. The models 
demonstrated that this is the case in the vast majority of countries independent of 
wealth, political stability and the percentage of immigrants. Non-fundamentalist 
religious believers indeed seem to internalize Christian moral teachings of neighborly 
love and this in turn seems to foster tolerance towards ethnic and religious out-groups. 
The finding confirms older findings by Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello (Scheepers, 
Gijsberts, and Hello 2002), who also found that doctrinal believing is negatively related 
to ethnic prejudice. Furthermore, the coefficient of belief in a Spirit/Life Force is larger 
than that of belief in a Personal God for both outcomes. This indicates congruent with 
modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004) that 
modern, fuzzy believers tend to be more tolerant. However, in both sets of multilevel 
models the coefficient of ‘I have my own way of connecting with the divine’ is 
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significantly smaller than the coefficients of the two God-beliefs. This might be due to 
the less clear-cut phrasing of the statement, which may have impacted measurement. 
Still, here too, the relationships are clearly negative for both outcomes.  
As expected based on prior literature (Glock and Stark 1966; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 
1992; Wylie and Forest 1992; Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995; Laythe et al. 2002), 
fundamentalism is strongly positively linked to intolerance towards Muslims and 
towards immigrants. Fundamentalism has the strongest coefficient of all believing 
measures. Its effect is even as large as the effects of education and right-wing 
authoritarianism, both traditionally strong predictors of intolerance. People who are 
closed-minded towards the truth-claims of other religions are indeed more likely to also 
be intolerant of their members and more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups in 
general. The models also show that fundamentalism is more strongly related to 
intolerance towards Muslims than intolerance towards immigrants. The findings are 
robust across Europe.  
Church attendance on its own is not statistically significantly related to intolerance 
towards Muslims and immigrants. Contrary to expectations based on social capital 
theory, being actively involved in church does not statistically significantly impact on 
religious and ethnic tolerance while volunteering in secular organizations does. 
Considering that church attendance rates have been steadily declining in most of Europe 
for many decades, this finding is perhaps not surprising. It adds support to prior 
observations by secularization-theorists (Pollack and Pickel 2007; Voas 2009): the 
traditional church has lost its significance as a social force in Europe. However, private 
intrinsic believing is still an important influence on civic attitudes. 
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As to the belonging dimension, Catholics, Orthodox and unchurched do not differ 
significantly in their propensity to tolerate Muslims and immigrants as neighbors. Only 
Protestants, who do not attend church regularly are significantly more likely than others 
to be intolerant towards the two out-groups. The finding can be understood in the light 
of identity theories (Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Tajfel 1974) and Allport’s (1967) 
theory of extrinsic religiosity: it is driven by non-devout Protestants who do not practice 
their religion, but utilize their church membership as an (extrinsic) identity marker 
against ethnic out-groups.  
Why this secular Protestant identity effect is only observed with regard to immigrants, 
not Muslims remains a puzzle. If the story behind this relationship was a simple ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ demarcation, we would expect to find the same relationship with regard 
to Muslims, - the main religious out-group in Europe. The data provide no easy 
explanation. A possible interpretation could be that members of religious 
denominations, even if they are not devout, tend to be more compassionate towards 
other religions than towards immigrants, because emphasizing a religious identity is a 
characteristic they have in common with Muslims. Immigrants, on the other hand, are 
an out-group they do not share an obvious common trait with.  However, this still does 
not explain why Protestants in particular are more intolerant towards immigrants than 
Catholics or Orthodox. One plausible explanation may lie in the growing secularism 
within European Protestantism: European Protestants are on average less devout than 
members of other Christian denominations (only 18 per cent attend church regularly 
compared with 46 per cent of Catholics and 32 per cent of Orthodox). Congruent with 
our other findings, - the religious are less likely to be intolerant than the non-religious, it 
is plausible that denominations that are on average more religious, also tend to be more 
tolerant towards ethnic and religious out-groups.  Another plausible explanation may be 
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the historical tendency of Protestantism towards particularism. The history of 
Protestantism in Europe is largely a history of sectarianism while the Catholic and 
Orthodox Church have traditionally emphasized inclusiveness and a universality claim 
that aims at crossing borders. Thus intolerance towards others might generally be more 
strongly discouraged in Catholic and Orthodox pews than in Protestant sects. However a 
further testing of these possible explanations is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
Protestant finding merits further exploration s in future  case studies of Protestant, 
Catholic and Orthodox communities using in-depth questions on how the believer’s 
attitudes towards ethnic and religious out-groups are affected by religious convictions 
and contexts. 
All in all, our findings show that when examining relationships between religion and 
attitudes like tolerance, it is important to distinguish between different dimensions of 
religiosity. Although our measurement of multi-dimensional religiosity is somewhat 
limited by the available data, our analyses come to a clear result: For both anti-Muslim- 
and anti-Immigrant intolerance, is the believing-dimension of religion that matters most: 
non-fundamentalist believing is clearly negatively and fundamentalist believing clearly 
positively related to both outcomes in the vast majority of countries.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper tried to examine to what extent individual religiosity is related to intolerance 
towards immigrants and Muslims, the main ethnic and religious out-groups in Europe. 
To this end, a distinction was made between a believing-, a belonging-, and a practice 
dimension of religiosity. The results show largely the same patterns of relationships for 
both outcomes: Religious believing matters greatly for European’s inclination to 
tolerate immigrants and Muslims. In the vast majority of countries and independent of 
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country-level wealth, political stability and the number of immigrants, traditional 
monotheistic and fuzzy modern  beliefs in God are strongly negatively related to both 
targets of intolerance, while the relationship between fundamentalism and intolerance is 
strongly positive. Non-fundamentalist religious believers, no matter whether they are 
traditional or modern, seem to contemplate the moral teachings of their religion and are 
therefore less likely to be intolerant towards cultural and ethnic out-groups than non-
believers.  
Across denominations and social strata in Europe, religious people are considerably less 
likely to be intolerant of ethnic and religious pout-groups than non-religious people. The 
results show that although the traditional churches have lost much of their social 
significance in Europe, private religious contemplation is still a strong social force 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
‘Do not like as Neighbors: 
Immigrants’ 
53682 0.181 0.385 0 1 
‘Do not like as Neighbors: 
Muslims/Christians’ 
54700 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Catholic 54700 0.317 0.465 0 1 
Protestant 54700 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Orthodox 54700 0.256 0.436 0 1 
Church Attendance 54127 3.369 1.918 1 7 
Belief: Personal God 54056 0.383 0.486 0 1 
Belief: Spirit/Life Force 54056 0.340 0.473 0 1 
Belief: Individualized Religiosity 53051 0.403 0.490 0 1 
Fundamentalism 53733 0.207 0.405 0 1 
Volunteering 54700 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Tertiary Education 54225 0.236 0.425 0 1 
Sex: Female 54688 0.558 0.496 0 1 
Long Term Unemployment 54700 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Age 54496 47.42 17.92 16 108 
Anomy Scale 53451 4.201 2.275 1 10 
Right-Wing  50745 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Strong Leader 53986 0.335 0.472 0 1 
Country: GDP, log-transformed 54700 9.832 1.016 7.435 11.678 
Percent Foreign-Born (mean 
centred and log transformed) 
54700 1.559 1.184 -2.700 3.805 
Political Stability Index  
(World Bank, mean centred) 











Table 2: Percentages of the Two Dependent Variables and the Difference between 
them per country 
  Immigrants Muslims Diff. 
  % %   
Iceland 3.3 7.5 4.2*** 
Switzerland 3.8 11.6 7.8*** 
Spain 4.2 12.8 8.6*** 
France 4.3 7.7 3.4*** 
Denmark 6 10.9 4.9*** 
Norway 6.1 13.4 7.3*** 
Belgium 6.4 14.9 8.5*** 
Sweden 6.4 15.9 9.5*** 
Germany West 7.3 17 9.7*** 
Portugal 7.8 14.4 6.6*** 
Montenegro 11 13.4 2.4 
Croatia 13 16 3.0*** 
Luxembourg 13.2 16.5 3.3*** 
Ireland 13.6 18.6 5.0*** 
Bosnia Herzegovina 14.4 14.6 0.2*** 
Germany East 14.4 31.4 17.0*** 
Great Britain 14.9 13.1 -1.8 
Hungary 15.2 10.9 -4.3*** 
Netherlands 15.3 18.5 3.2*** 
Finland 15.4 22.5 7.1*** 
Greece 15.5 17 1.5 
Italy 15.7 21.3 5.6*** 
Slovak Republic 15.7 21.3 5.6*** 
Bulgaria 17 20.5 3.5** 
Poland 17.1 24.2 7.1*** 
Ukraine 17.6 23.2 5.6*** 
Moldova 18.9 34.8 15.9** 
Romania 20 19.9 -0.1 
Macedonia 20.3 24.5 4.2*** 
Latvia 20.4 27.6 7.2*** 
Northern Ireland 20.6 18.2 -2.4 
Serbia 21.9 24.7 2.8** 
Austria 23 30.5 7.5*** 
Cyprus 23.9 35.1 11.2*** 
Belarus 26.3 23.5 -2.8 
Slovenia 28.1 28.6 0.5 
Georgia 28.3 40.1 11.8*** 
Lithuania 28.5 46.7 18.2*** 
Czech Republic 29.5 29.3 -0.2 
Albania 29.6 26.1 -3.5* 
Estonia 31.3 32.7 1.4 
Russian Federation 32 20.8 -11.2*** 
Malta 33 30.4 -2.6 
Armenia 35.7 36.9 1.2 
Total 19.8 23.6 3.8 
* p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001, Difference Test using paired t-tests.
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Table 3:  Intolerance towards Muslims, Random Intercept Models 
DV: “...Neighbors: Muslims” 
 
M1   M3  M4  
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Catholic -0.050 0.040 -0.083* 0.043 -0.080 0.042 
Protestant 0.058 0.050 0.037 0.052 0.044 0.052 
Orthodox 0.026 0.047 -0.001 0.050 -0.009 0.050 
Other Denomination -0.280** 0.091 -0.282** 0.099 -0.281** 0.099 
Church Attendance 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.008 
Volunteering -0.115*** 0.028 -0.089** 0.030 -0.087** 0.030 
Belief: Personal God -0.133*** 0.034 -0.128*** 0.036 -0.129*** 0.036 
Belief: Spirit/Life Force -0.217*** 0.030 -0.169*** 0.033 -0.170*** 0.032 
Belief: Individualized Religiosity -0.084*** 0.023 -0.078** 0.025 -0.077** 0.024 
Belief: “There is only one true religion”  0.388*** 0.028 0.316*** 0.031 0.315*** 0.030 
Tertiary Education   -0.285*** 0.030 -0.284*** 0.029 
Sex: Female   -0.167*** 0.024 -0.166*** 0.023 
Long -Term Unemployment   0.045 0.030 0.043 0.029 
Age   -0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
Age squared   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anomy   0.035*** 0.005 0.035*** 0.005 
Right-Wing   0.377*** 0.031 0.375*** 0.031 
Right-Wing Don’t Know   0.084** 0.032 0.081* 0.031 
Strong Leader   0.282*** 0.027 0.280*** 0.026 
Leader Don’t Know   0.141** 0.044 0.140** 0.044 
GDP (log-transformed)     -0.289** 0.106 
% Foreign-born Country (log-transformed)     -0.001 0.059 
Political Instability     0.319*** 0.179 
       
Iceland -2.433*** 0.492 -2.610*** 0.500 0.304 1.131 
Constant -Iceland -1.202*** 0.077 -1.464*** 0.114 1.367 1.017 
Random Part       
Level 2 Variance Ϭ2 u0 0.468 *** 0.051 0.473*** 0.052 0.427 *** 0.047 
N 51844  46893  46893  
∆  -2-Log-Likelihood     7.89   
-2-Log-Likelihood 53057.006  47429.262  47421.374  
AIC 53083.006  47475.262  47473.375  
BIC 53198.134  47676.641  47701.021  
* p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001 
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Table 4:  Intolerance towards Immigrants, Random Intercept Models 
DV: “...Neighbors: Immigrants” M1   M2  M3  M4  
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Catholic 0.000 0.044 -0.008 0.047 -0.020 0.048 -0.003 0.047 
Protestant 0.119* 0.057 0.113 0.060 0.122* 0.060 0.269***. 0.097 
Orthodox 0.081 0.049 0.089 0.053 0.064 0.053 0.076 0.053 
Other Denomination -0.100 0.100 -0.037 0.108 -0.055 0.108 -0.040 0.108 
Church Attendance -0.008 0.008 -0.010 0.009 -0.004 0.009 -0.010 0.009 
Volunteering -0.142*** 0.031 -0.104** 0.033 -0.100*** 0.033 -0.102** 0.033 
Belief: Personal God -0.097** 0.037 -0.088* 0.040 -0.086* 0.040 -0.090* 0.040 
Belief: Spirit/Life Force -0.205*** 0.033 -0.170*** 0.036 -0.170*** 0.036 -0.170*** 0.036 
Belief: Individualized Religiosity -0.060* 0.025 -0.055* 0.027 -0.054* 0.027 -0.055* 0.027 
Belief: “There is only one true religion”  0.313*** 0.031 0.245*** 0.033 0.243*** 0.033 0.243*** 0.033 
Tertiary Education   -0.166*** 0.032 -0.165*** 0.032 -0.166*** 0.032 
Sex: Female   -0.105*** 0.026 -0.105*** 0.025 -0.104*** 0.025 
Long -Term Unemployment   -0.002 0.032 -0.004 0.032 -0.004 0.032 
Age   -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.004 
Age squared   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anomy   0.037*** 0.006 0.037*** 0.005 0.037*** 0.005 
Right-Wing   0.163*** 0.035 0.160*** 0.035 0.162*** 0.035 
Right-Wing Don’t Know   0.027 0.034 0.025 0.034 0.025 0.034 
Strong Leader   0.254*** 0.029 0.251*** 0.029 0.251*** 0.029 
Leader Don’t Know   0.186*** 0.048 0.185*** 0.048 0.185*** 0.048 
Interaction: Protestant* Church Attendance       -0.046* 0.023 
GDP (log-transformed)     -0.406** 0.146 -0.406** 0.146 
% Foreign-born Country (log-transformed)     -0.020 0.082 -0.020 0.082 
Political Instability      0.249 0.246  0.249 0.246 
Constant -1.600*** 0.109 -1.834*** 0.141 2.194 1.408 2.198 1.401 
Random Part         
Level 2 Variance Ϭ2 u0 0.690 *** 0.076 0.675 *** 0.075 0.465*** 0.103 0.593*** 0.065 
N 50968  46149  46149  46149  
∆  -2-Log-Likelihood     15.12***  11.52***  
-2-Log-Likelihood 45406.684  40575.26  40560.14  40563.736  
AIC 45430.684  40619.260  40612.14  40613.736  
BIC 45536.751  40811.532  40839.37  40832.227  




Table 5a: The Coefficients of the Religion Measures when included separately in the Multilevel Models 
DV: “Would not like as 
Neighbors: Muslims” 
Coefficients from Separate Multilevel Models  
of each Religion Measure on its own on Intolerance towards Muslims 
 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Catholic -.061 .034         
Protestant .022 .046         
Orthodox .033 .042         
Other  Denomination -.271*** .086         
Church Attendance   .008 .006       
Belief: Personal God     -.068* .034     
Belief: Spirit/Life Force     -.244*** .035     
Belief: Individualized 
Religiosity 
      -.106*** .022   
Belief: Fundamentalism         .380*** .026 
 
Table 5b: The Coefficients of the Religion Measures when included separately in the Multilevel Models 
DV: “Would not like as 
Neighbors: Immigrants” 
Coefficients from Separate Multilevel Models 
of each Religion  Measure on its own on Intolerance towards Immigrants 
 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Catholic -.034 .038         
Protestant .080 .053         
Orthodox .058 .044         
Other  Denomination -.134 .095         
Church Attendance   -.002 .006       
Belief: Personal God     -.045 .025     
Belief: Spirit/Life Force     -.214*** .038     
Belief: Individualized 
Religiosity 
      -.076*** .024   
Belief: Fundamentalism         .298*** .029 
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Table 6: Random Slope Variances of each Religion Variable 



















Belief: Personal God 0.023* 0.010 16.23 0.031* 0.014 9.61 
Belief: Spirit/Life 
Force 
0.041* 0.015 28.59 0.050** 0.018 25.79 
Individualized 
Religiosity 
0.020* 0.010 11.37 0.019 0.010 4.59 
Fundamentalism 0.069** 0.023 42.15 0.120*** 0.041 44.93 
Protestant     .085 .056 3.42 
 
 




                                                          
10 The country abbreviations used in the EVS-2008-data follow the standard ISO 3166-1 alpha-
2 codes.  
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Figure 2: The Random Coefficient of Fundamentalism 
 
 
 
 
